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Abstract
Natural resources are infinite. Th is  is possible because humans can
create theories whose potential goes beyond the limited imaginative ca-
pacity of the inventor. For instance, no number of people can work out
all the economic potential of quantum theory. Economic Resources are
created by an interaction of Karl Popper's Worlds 1, 2 k  3, the worlds
of physics, psychology and the abstract products of the human mind,
such as scientific theories. Knowledge such as scientific theories has
unfathomable information content, is universally applicable, and infin-
itely copyable. T h e  point can be made with technological knowledge
such as that embodied in the wheel. The  theory of the wheel has un-
bounded potential to be embodied in unforeseeable new technologies,
is useful on the Moon as on Earth, and can be infinitely copied. Unlike
a piece of land (using fixed factors), such knowledge shows increasing
returns. T h i s  helps to explain Julian Simon's observation that "nat-
ural" resources are now less scarce than they used to be and why an
increasing population can increase resources in the long-run. I t  was Si-
mon's breakthrough to elaborate on the abstract character of "natural"
resources. I  further explore this abstract character and thereby explain
why natural resources are infinitely expandable.
Economic growth and the creation of natural resources depends on
the rate of  invention. F .  Machlup's suggestion (Machlup 1962) that
the opportunity for new inventions increases geometrically wi th the
number of inventions at hand is acknowledged for its suggestiveness,
but criticised for its conservative position. Frank Tipler's fascinating
argument for indefinite economic growth (Tipler 1994), is reinforced
by my argument by making a distinction between information in the
engineer's sense and the infinite potential "information" in our scientific
knowledge based on Popper's notion of information content.
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1 Introduction
(1) How is it possible for a resource to be both scarce and innite?
Most philosophical treatments begin their discussions of global problems by
taking the nite-resource view for granted. I contend that economic raw
material resources are in an important sense innite in the long-run. With
the invention of the rocket and nuclear power, we may have already cre-
ated the theoretical knowledge that will make economic resources innitely
expandable.1 Like all theoretical knowledge, these inventions have unfathom-
able economic potential and instead of showing diminishing returns (like a
piece of land), show increasing returns. Just think how more more useful a
transistor is now than it was 50 years ago when rst invented. How much
more useful are the natural numbers now than they were when rst inven-
ted simply for counting? But this marvelous quality of abstract knowledge
needs a philosophical explanation. A combination of Julian Simon’s analysis
of the concept of a natural resource (Simon 1981) plus Popper’s Worlds 1,
2 and 3 (Popper 1993), helps us to understand the nature of a resource and,
as a bonus, helps to explain how natural resources might be both scarce and
innitely expandable.
(2) I argue, along with Simon, that the conventional notion of a natural
resource is profoundly misleading. It implies that resources are simply por-
tions of matter/energy just waiting to be discovered. On the contrary, even
\natural" resources are created by an interaction between the human mind,
theories and the physical world. In a sense, all resources are created, articial.
Seen from this angle, the issue of the nite/innite extent of resources solicits
a very dierent sort of answer. But we may consider that even Simon’s notion
of a resource needs to be extended to more accurately describe the multifa-
ceted nature of a resource, taking into account its physical, psychological and
logical (or abstract) character.
(3) The growth of knowledge or World 3 in general impacts on economic
growth and the scarcity of resources through the aect it has on the rate of
invention. F. Machlup’s suggestion (Machlup 1962) that the opportunity for
new inventions increases geometrically with the number of inventions at hand
is criticised for its conservative position. Frank Tipler’s fascinating argument
for indenite economic growth (Tipler 1994), is reinforced by my argument
by making a distinction between information in the engineer’s sense and the
innite potential \information" in our scientic knowledge.
(4) My thesis is that at any given time, raw material resources are scarce
1See (Tipler 1994). Tipler would add computing theory to nuclear power and rocketry
as the sucient conditions for permanent economic growth.
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in that humans have more uses for them than they are able to satisfy (for
the most in-depth criticism of the possibility of eliminating scarcity in this
traditional economic sense, see Steele 1992). However, the flow of services
from raw material resources is in principle innitely expandable over time
without diminishing returns. This is made possible by the innite potential
of our theoretical understanding of a resource. A piece of copper may be used
over and over again indenitely without diminishing its quantity. But this
does not capture its full potential as a useful item. To capture this you need
to examine the theories we use in our use of the copper.
(5) Popper divides all that exists into three domains: World 1 (the world of
physics, chemistry and biology), World 2 (the world of psychological states,
dispositions and processes), and World 3 (the sum total of the objective
abstract products of the human mind). The purpose of the theory of World 3
was to account for the objectivity of scientic criticism, creativity and the
relationship between the mind and the body. Both Popper and Eccles see
World 3 as containing such things as theories, numbers, and even tools and
institutions considered as abstractions (Popper & Eccles 1977). They are
our products, but once created they have autonomous existence, properties
and relations that go beyond our expectations and intentions, indeed beyond
any psychological states. The natural numbers were created by us but we
then discovered, as an unforeseeable and irrevocable consequence, that this
sequence has odd and even numbers. Through a sort of plastic control, world
3 is able to aect and constrain our thought and, only through our thought,
influence World 1. The invention of numbers, for example, enabled us to
develop counting and calculating methods such as calendars, balances and
computers that in turn greatly changed the physical world.
(6) I argue that inventions and, less obviously, natural resources have three
ontological aspects: a World 1 aspect, a World 2 aspect and a World 3 aspect.
1. Economic theory was rst worked out as it applies to humans, but at
least some economic theorems apply to all organisms. Economics is
as old as life itself and like other aspects of life, it has an evolutionary
history. Thus there were relatively crude economic resources even before
the advent of consciousness. But with consciousness and especially the
emergence of human time-binding and the ability to create and visualize
new independent, distant goals and means for reaching them, more
interesting economic actions became possible.
Previously useless physical substances become resources, created by
our valuations, intentions and imagination with respect to their phys-
ical properties. Copper became a new economic resource when people
placed various portions of it within new means-end schemes. There was
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a time when humans had no use for copper, but now it can be used in
copper wiring in TV sets etc. At this level of analysis, a resource is a
World 2 object.
2. A resource can also be captured in an objective abstract theory or
cluster of theories. The metal in a computer becomes very useful only
because of the enormous amounts of abstract mathematics, logic and
other technological theory embodied in it. Thus a resource is a World 3
object.
3. Along with the inventions that make natural resources useful and ex-
pand them, their innite long-term serviceability without diminishing
returns is made possible partly by their World 3 characteristics: namely,
the objective logical properties of the theories that partly constitute
them.
(7) That a natural resource such as copper is a World 1 object might seem
obvious. But every resource is not simply a portion of matter or energy, but
becomes a resource on account of being interpreted (correctly) as part of a
theoretical means-end relationship. (This means-end scheme may be a rather
complex cluster of technical and social hypotheses). For it is the services we
can obtain from a natural resource that we are interested in when we speak
of a natural resource.
(8) A similar point has been made about other \objects" of social science:
money, for example, is not money until it is interpreted and valued as money2
(cf. Searle 1984). Such thinking can, I think, be traced back to the marginalist
revolution in economics, inaugurated by Menger (1871), Walrus (1874) and
Jevons (1871). This placed a general theoretical emphasis on the importance
of subjective factors in social science. To reinforce the point made by Searle
and others, it might be said that these interpretive theories may only become
conscious when something goes wrong and they are refuted. For example,
during a hyperinflation money ceases to be money because people no longer
see it as money, i.e., each person no longer entertains the theory that most
other people think that it is valuable to most other people. My point is that
just as there is no chemical or physical analysis alone that will determine
what makes money money, so there is no chemical or physical analysis alone
that will determine what makes a resource a resource.
(9) On the other hand, I want to say that because of the, in many ways
laudable, emphasis on subjective factors instigated by the marginalist school
of economics, there may be a tendency to overlook the part played by the
2Of course, certain sorts of objects will be objectively more suited to perform the
function of money.
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objective content of our theories and other abstract products of our minds.
This is easily done without the distinction between Worlds 1, 2 and 3. The-
ories, considered as objective knowledge, have a special economic status that
makes them quite dierent to, say, a piece of land. Economic knowledge may
be divided into the unspeciable personal knowledge of circumstances and
skills (such as the ability to ride a bicycle or use a tool or machine) stressed
by Hayek (1945) and Polanyi (1958) and the speciable objective knowledge
(such as scientic theories) stressed by Popper (1972)3 . Popper argues that
objective knowledge, the kind we nd represented in books, tapes, computer
memory, has an autonomous existence from the psychological or physical
states that produced it and in which it may be represented.4 I would like to
suggest that focusing on the World 2 psychological aspects of economic know-
ledge obscures the interesting ramications that flow from the innite content
of the theories that interpret sections of World 1 to make resources. There-
fore, some economic knowledge has a special metaphysical status. The special
autonomous properties of this domain of economic knowledge has interesting
implications and ramications for the nature of scarcity and the power of the
inventions we use to reduce scarcity.
2 Respectable Metaphysics Versus Partial Op-
erationalism
(10) In dealing with the issue of the innite versus nite nature of resources,
we are dealing with a metaphysical issue. Expressed colloquially, metaphysics
provides a view of the world as a whole. An example of such a view was
Faraday’s conception of the universe as a network of elds of forces.
(11) Methodologically, I think it useful to interpret metaphysical issues in
terms of theories and their logical relationships with one another. Provision-
ally, we may say that a metaphysical theory is one that taken alone is empir-
ically untestable by confrontation with basic statements. A basic statement
is one that describes an observable event of denite space-time coordinates.
3The most recent strong argument for the non-speciable nature of personal skills and
even the ability to discover mathematical proofs is presented by Roger Penrose in Shadows
of the Mind (Penrose 1994).
4One might say that the division into personal versus objective knowledge obscures the
fact that some intentional states (e.g., dispositional expectations) shade over into propos-
itional intentional states, i.e., World 3 status. Peoples’ \constitutive" attitude to money
is a good example, for it may only be a shock like a hyperinflation that jolts people into
making their unconscious expectations explicit and placed in linguistic form. But we do
need the distinction between Worlds 2 and 3 to talk about the transition from one state to
the other.
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\There is red ball of at least 8 cm diameter within one meter of the entrance
to Bolton’s central library" is a basic statement. An example of a metaphys-
ical statement would be \There is a red ball which will give everlasting life
to the person who touches it". To emphasise the fact that this distinction is
one of logic and not between the everyday and the mystical, this last example
can be changed to \There is an incompressible red ball". Another example
would be \There is an inexhaustible barrel of oil". This denition of meta-
physical conforms with the traditional sense in which metaphysics transcends
experience, but conformity with tradition is not crucial. More importantly,
it allows us to talk about interesting logical relationships between statements
of quite diering character.
(12) All economic theories, even if they are scientic in being empirically
falsiable, contain explicit or implicit metaphysical assumptions or presup-
positions. In this they are in good company as all the great scientic theories
were not only inspired by, but also contained, metaphysics. In some cases
the metaphysical elements are simply weak logical implications of the empir-
ical theory. In some cases the metaphysical elements are more like adjuncts
that can be dispensed with without diminishing the empirical content of the
theory. In many cases, however, they play an important role not only in
augmenting empirical content, but in guiding research. cf. (Watkins 1958).
Also (Watkins 1975). See also (Agassi 1964). More recently (Zahar 1989).
(13) I have said that metaphysical statements are untestable by direct con-
frontation with basic statements, but things are not so simple. Popper has
even shown that combining what are individually untestable metaphysical
statements can sometimes yield a testable theory (Popper 1982b, Chapter
III). This clearly shows that a statement may be only relatively metaphys-
ical. This perhaps should not be so surprising as even scientic statements
of the law-like variety only become fully testable in the presence of initial
conditions and other theories, though some crude testable implications are
derivable from the law-statement alone.5 In any case, it is clear that in the
analysis of metaphysics we have moved a long way from the cavalier attitude
of the Vienna circle, and that metaphysical elements in science require serious
and discerning treatment. In assessing the empirical value of a statement that
is metaphysical when taken alone, one has to investigate its role within a lar-
ger system of hypotheses, how it contributes to the empirical consequences of
5For example, from the law-like statement \At atmospheric pressure silver melts at 960
degrees centigrade." one cannot derive a statement predicting a melting of silver at some
denite spatio-temporal coordinates, or indeed even a purely existential statement to the
eect \that some silver at some place and time has melted at 960 degrees centigrade at
atmospheric pressure". But one can derive negative predictions, such as the statement
\One will not observe the melting of silver below 960 degrees centigrade at spatio-temporal
coordinates w; x; y; z at atmospheric pressure".
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the system. The point here is that even though the assumption that resources
are innite may itself be untestable, the explanatory theory in which it occurs
may be the more powerful (and more testable) for its presence.
(14) Examples of metaphysical doctrines are atomism, determinism, the
irreversibility of time, and recently the idea of locality in physics.6
(15) Let us become acquainted with the feel of metaphysical statements. I
was struck recently by how common unacknowledged metaphysical assump-
tions are in every day conversations. One I encountered recently might be
called failure-metaphysics: there are some people who have fallen into cir-
cumstances of poverty and misery from which it is impossible to escape. If
any putative conrming candidate subsequently becomes rich and happy, then
the advocate of failure-metaphysics can always say that he misidentied the
example. Of course, the contrary (success-metaphysics), that there is always
a way of escaping from any circumstances of poverty providing one uses the
correct methods is also untestable by itself. Such metaphysical assumptions
are more to do with self-help methods than economic theory as such. An
example from economics might be the following:
A person is willing to sacrice some bit of any desired thing if
he can obtain a sucient increase in the amount of some other
desired goods. (Alchian & Allen 1964, p. 21)
(16) This is not empirically testable as it stands, for no limit is placed on
what might be a \sucient" increase in other goods: does it stop short of
owning the Earth, the Solar system, the Universe? Nor does it specify a
limit on the smallest \bit" of sacrice allowed: does it include the sacrice
of one 1/1000th of a cup of coee per year? However, I do suspect that
this \postulate" does contribute to a theoretical system that is empirically
testable when taken as a whole. The situation is analogous to Einstein’s use
of Lobachevskian geometry in his theory. By itself, Lobachevskian geometry
6The logical form of metaphysical doctrines may be of the all-Some variety. For example,
determinism may be stated thus: for every event there is a cause. Or more informatively,
for every event x there exist a y and a z such that y is a lawful relationship describable by
some true universal law u, and z is an event (set of initial conditions) preceding x, and x
is predictable (deducible) from z in the presence of y (or of u) (cf. Popper 1982a, p. 196).
This is clearly untestable by confrontation with a basic statement, for suppose someone
presents the determinist with a putatively uncaused event. The determinist always has two
defensive options. No matter how far you have searched for the cause of some unexplained
event and failed, the determinist can say either that you failed to look hard enough for
the initial conditions or that you have insucient imagination to formulate the correct
lawful relationship connecting the two events (the initial conditions and the event to be
explained). He can say this because you cannot logically exclude the possibility that the
very next search will identify the cause.
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cannot be empirically refuted, but it can contribute to the refutable empirical
content of a theory. Assuming the economic postulate to be true, it does lead
one on to interesting speculations about values and the structure of the world.
For example, most people will not sacrice any amount, however small, of
their moral values such as \Thou shalt not kill". Is this a refutation of the
postulate or could it be that the world is such that the \pay-o" just could
not be arranged, perhaps because of the constraints of physical laws etc.
Perhaps some might murder if the reward were everlasting life for them and
their family|the Vampire option. But the world is such that everlasting life
is impossible.
(17) Although the assumption of innite resources and its contrary are
metaphysical they play an important part in the empirical theories to which
they belong. The assumption of innite resources can be stated as follows: for
every increase in resource-scarcity, there is at least one resource-augmenting
invention or discovery that will more than compensate for this increased
scarcity. The assumption of nite resources can be stated thus: at some
point in the future the amount of resource-scarcity will increase irretrievably.
Taken alone each of these statements is obviously metaphysical in the narrow
sense of being unfalsiable by confrontation with basic statements. The rst
places no limit on the delay between an increase in scarcity and its correc-
tion and it is not clear whether the compensatory correction takes account of
time-preference. The resource nitist can sustain their gloom no matter how
long humans live in abundance and luxury.
(18) The resource-nitists do try to include testable assumptions. The
standard approach to estimating global resource quantity is rst to estim-
ate the presently-known physical quantity of the resource, secondly estimate
the current rate of use, and nally predict a diminution of the rst estimate
over successive periods of time until the rst estimate is exhausted. This ap-
proach, as Simon points out, is based on a confusion of the micro and macro
contexts (Simon 1982). It is based on Hotelling’s theory of the optimum rate
of use of a spatially denite mine or well. The resource nitist’s error can
be put this way. The world’s resources are seen as a large store-house which
will be emptied in a nite period even if our technology improves the speed
with which we empty it. But the world is not a store-house with pre-dened
nite contents, since it is interpreted by our creative minds and theories.
(19) Prima facie, one might think (as Julian Simon does) that there are
two ways of challenging the assumption of nite resources in the long run
in a macroeconomic context. One is to point to empirical statistics, such
as trends in resource prices and invention creation, and project from past
data, a method pioneered by Barnet & Morse (1963). For example, price
data for minerals over the past 200 years was adduced by Barnet and Morse
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(and more recently by Julian Simon) to show that the scarcity of minerals has
actually been declining over the centuries, contrary to popular imagination.
The argument is that if a resource were becoming more scarce, its price would
be bid up by speculators, so reflecting its greater future level of scarcity. To
reinforce this, statistics on the increasing rate of creation of inventions (some
of which increase resources) is also adduced. When one projects this data
into the future, the picture looks quite rosy. The supposed alternative is take
a more theoretical approach.
(20) But such a division into empirical versus theoretical approaches is un-
sound. One can do theory without empirical research, for one can test a
theory for internal inconsistency, simplicity, axiomatizablity and consistency
with other background theories; but one cannot do empirical research without
some, perhaps implicit, theory, as even singular statements describing denite
events or objects contain universal terms that have dispositional (and coun-
terfactual) implications that transcend any immediate (or indeed any nite
set of) experiences or observations (Popper 1980). Even the seemingly trivial
and untheoretical statement \There is petroleum oil in that barrel" is highly
theoretical in that its implications go far beyond any experience. The state-
ment implies that the liquid in the barrel can be rened into petrol and other
useful organic substances.
(21) Simon thinks that the reason why economists have been slow to adopt
the Barnet and Morse approach is that it is merely empirical or rule of thumb,
without a theoretical justication. The resource nitist is interpreting the data
in the light of a metaphysical theory. The resource nitist sees the world as
a nite store-house. Humans may be getting the goods out faster and faster
with improvements in the machines they use, but this will only empty the
store-house sooner.
(22) To provide a theoretical interpretation of the data Simon introduces the
idea of partial operationalism. Simon stops short of a wholesale operational-
ism, but insists that in order for any economic theory of nite resources to be
testable, one has to construct an operational denition of the word \nite" in
order that it may be measurable. The attempt to make any theory more test-
able is admirable. However, this aspect of Simon’s approach is unsuccessful.
Testability and measurability are, though related, quite dierent concepts.
Strictly, introducing measurement-orientated concepts may increase the em-
pirical information content of our theories, and as such is to be valued, but a
theory may lack measurable concepts and still be testable. Moreover, a the-
ory may be replete with measurable concepts and still be metaphysical, for
example: \there exists a cylindrical iridium rod of precisely 1 centimetre in
diameter and 1 metre long." One may consistently maintain such a theory no
matter how much of space-time is surveyed. Even if some plausible candidate
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were found, the testability of the statement is conned to ranges of measure-
ment outside the physical limits of measurement because of the qualication
\precisely".
2.1 Explaining versus Justifying Predictions of Scarcity
(23) I think that there is another more profound problem with the assess-
ment of past price data. I think that the relevance of past price data is to be
understood through a separation of the notions of justication and explana-
tion. I would suggest that all the really interesting so-called \justications"
of a scientic theory (those that are obtained by trying to test the theory)
should be looked at as cases of explanation. It is, after all, the intellectual
revelation and economic usefulness of an explanation that we want, and not
its justication. One can act no better than in the light of the truth, so
adding justication is both intellectually and economically superfluous. This
puts past price-data in another light. It is not something that completely
determines the theory (and projections), but something that can only test
alternative theories (along with their projections).
(24) Those who wish to argue that raw material resources are innite should
aim for the best empirically testable theory that both explains past data and
how resources might be indenitely expanded in the future. One need not
\justify" future predictions on the basis of past data. On the contrary, the
question should be: how do we explain both the past price data and explain
the hypothetical projection? Ever since Hume undermined both simple and
probabilistic induction, we have known that an innite number of future pro-
jections are logically compatible with any series of past data taken alone.7
(For a recent refutation of inductivist thinking see Miller 1994) In order to
exclude at least some projections one needs a universal theory. Notice I am
talking about explaining declining scarcity, not justifying such a prediction.
Ideally, in a scientic prediction one needs a universal theory plus initial
conditions to logically derive (but note, not demonstrate) a denite testable
description of some future state of aairs. But short of this, one can settle
for a more or less schematic explanation, which is often the case in the so-
7Popper deals with the methodological problem of picking the best curve through some
given graphical points in sections 32 & 38 of Logic of Scientic Discovery (Popper 1980).
Popper argues that given that one wants the most informative, and therefore most falsi-
able, theory one should opt for the (theory) curve that has the lower degree of dimensional-
ity, i.e., the one whose statement requires the smaller number of parameters. Theories with
higher dimensionality require a greater number of basic statements to falsify them. For
example, to refute the theory that all planetary orbits are circles requires only 4 singular
statements, whereas to refute the theory that all planetary orbits are ellipses would require
six singular statements.
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cial sciences. An extreme example is our everyday schematic explanations of
human actions: even though we do not scientically predict in detail a piece
of behaviour we can understand it afterwards in the context of the person’s
knowledge, aims and problems.8 If someone shivers on a cold day, this alone
will be insucient to allow us to scientically predict that he will put his coat
on; but if he does put his coat on, we have no hesitation in explaining this as
his attempt to get warm, because we have a general theory that sees humans
as goal-directed, rational agents etc.
(25) The sort of thing that can be done is for the resource-nitist and
resource-innitist to put some time limit on the predictions:
1. Resource-nitist: measured in real prices over 20 year periods, re-
sources will consistently become more scarce;
2. Resource-innitist: Any diminution of resources, measured in real
prices over 20 year periods, will be more than compensated for within
a 20 year period.
(26) Are there any general theoretical ways of explaining why resources
and resource-augmenting inventions do not simply dry up? I do not think
it possible to develop a theory from which one can scientically derive the
prediction of continued growth in economically useful inventions. I do not
think that this is possible because, as Popper has argued, technical develop-
ments are strongly influenced by the emergence of new ideas, but there are
logical reasons why one cannot predict (scientically) any radically new idea
(Popper 1982a). The argument is involved, but briefly and crudely put it is
that if one succeeded in predicting now the emergence in the future of some
new idea, this would be paradoxical since how can an idea that is only new in
the future be predicted now. The idea would, after all, have to be stated now
as part of the prediction, but it’s newness would evaporate as soon it was
stated. This argument leaves open shrewd conjectures about future technical
development that are not strictly derived from theory plus initial conditions,
and also the possibility of predicting types of new ideas rather than denite
descriptions of future inventions. It also allows for carefully stated conditional
predictions. One must also bear in mind that a single new unpredictable idea
may lead to the destruction of society as such.
(27) Nevertheless, I do believe it possible to oer a very general argument
8With the spread of psychological knowledge, this is a little unfair to \everyday" ex-
planations. The knowledge of visual illusions, for example, is quite wide spread, and with
this knowledge one can make quite precise predictions about another person’s subjective
experience and possible introspective reports.
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that suggests the sort of considerations that are necessary (though not su-
cient) to explain schematically:
1. The emergence of an invention or new application of an old invention
in response to a problem. This may only be possible in retrospect.
2. Why indenitely continued invention is possible. One might think that
resources will be nite in the long run because one will eventually \use
up" the old inventions. My argument shows that possible inventions are
not nite in the long run.
(28) Natural resources are innite because of the following two fundamental
facts:
1. A theory (such as the theory of boolean logic gates used in computers)
can be applied an innite number of times and in an innite number of
dierent useful projects because of its universal reference to all space
and time and because of its innitely varied logical and (in the case of
scientic theories) information content.
2. Any two theories of technological use can be usefully combined not in
just one way, but in an innite number of ways. Not necessarily alone:
a hair-dryer and a computer, for example, may not be easily combined
directly, but they may be combined in a larger means-end scheme.
3 A Summary of Simon's Argument for the In-
nite Extent of Resources
(29) The most powerful general theoretical argument against the claim that
natural resources are nite comes from the pen of Julian Simon. Simon places
the issue of natural resources in the context of the debate on the impact of
population growth on the world’s resources. Simon’s basic point is that the
concept of a natural resource can be dened for economic theory only relative
to a service that we obtain from it. In this approach, Simon is systematically
applying Alfred Marshall’s conception of an economic good. Simon thus
focuses on the World 2 aspect of a resource. Before a use for oil was invented
it was not a resource (in fact, it was a nuisance to farmers). Similarly, petrol
was at rst regarded as a dangerous by-product of the extraction of paran.
I guess there is at least ten million tons of copper in the core of the star Alpha
Centauri, but it is not a resource (at present) because no one can possibly
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use it for any service. (This is not to say that it may not become a resource
in the future. It is an extreme example to show that the concept of a resource
includes the notion of service.) Things become less clear in some respects and
clearer in others when one considers such things as beautiful views of sunsets
over the Amazon forest. Views, or at least ones that can be appreciated as
resources, only come into existence with the emergence of self conscious minds
that can frame them and regard them as a product of, but also as independent
of, the self. A beautiful view is less clearly part of a means-end scheme than
a piece of copper, but E. Gombrich has argued that they are constituted by a
theoretical framing of the visual world (Gombrich 1960). Moreover, if people
are willing to pay for a view then we can more easily see that they are part
of a means-end scheme.
(30) On this analysis of natural resource, the implication of the claim that
our natural resources are nite is that the amount (or even types) of ser-
vices that we can obtain from the world are limited. You can see that we
are already moving away from the idea that a resource is identiable with
a lump of matter/energy alone and that we must bring in a psychological
interpretation (World 2) that links any given resource material to a goal in
such a way that the agent regards the material as a means to the goal. As
I have already hinted in the introduction, this psychological element already
involves a theoretical component that enables the subject to grasp the goal
and the means and their relationship to one another and to the self. Popper
argues in Objective Knowledge that all understanding involves the grasping
of a World 3 object or relationship (Popper 1972). We can extend this to
the understanding that is involved in a subjects’ economic behaviour. Under-
standing a means-end relationship often involves understanding that there are
alternative means and alternative goals to choose from. It is impossible to
construct this understanding except in terms of the subject’s use of theoretical
interpretations|that is, World 3 objects.
(31) The involvement of World 3 in the question of scarcity becomes clearer
once we review the ways in which the scarcity of a resource (i.e., its services)
can be reduced:
1. Discoveries of further deposits.
2. Invention of substitute products.
3. Invention of more ecient ways of surveying, mining, processing and
transporting the resource.
(32) All these ways of augmenting resources involve not only psychological
(intentional) states (World 2), but the use of linguistically formulated theories
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(world 3). The discovery and invention of new resources and products can be
an extremely theoretical task. The discovery of further deposits of a mineral,
for example, often involves the use of astrophysical theories and the theoretical
interpretation of satellite and seismic data.
(33) Simon argues that as population growth puts a pressure on the demand
for services from resources, the real cost and prices of these resources may
increase. But this very pressure creates the incentive for further inventions
which not only compensate for the increased demand but increase production
to lower costs and prices below their pre-shortage values. (This is the best
explanation for the results of extensive historical research. cf. Boserup 1981)
(34) So the argument moves from whether there is a xed amount of copper
in a mine or the Earth etc., to whether there are diminishing returns in the
long run given (a) the growth of our total imaginative capacity (World 2)
and (b) the growth of our inventions and in general our World 3 objective
knowledge. Both of these increase with increases in population, since the
more people there are, the more minds there are to work on problems of
scarcity and add to our objective knowledge.
(35) We have shown that it is the volume of services we obtain from a
resource that is the most meaningful index of the quantity of a resource.
Having established this, it becomes possible to envision the uninterrupted
physical depletion of a non-renewable resource in a never ending process in
which the total volume of services obtainable per unit of physical resource
increases practically forever. (The only limit might be the atomic nature
of matter. But what might be more important than physical quantity is
accessibility for use. The last remaining atoms of the resource may just
become less frequently available for use in any given project.)
(36) This is how Simon (1986, p. 55) sums up his position with respect to
his predecessors:
It is important to notice that there need not be diminishing re-
turns over time to additional people, because the stock of techno-
logy with which people may combine their creative talents grows
with time. Kuznets makes an argument for increasing returns
on two grounds: (a) the stimulative eect of a dense environ-
ment, and (b) \interdependence of knowledge of the various parts
of the world in which we human beings operate" (Kuznets 1960,
p. 328); for example, discoveries in physics stimulate discoveries
in biology, and vice versa. Kuznets discounts the possibility of di-
minishing returns because \the universe is far too vast relative to
the size of our planet and what we know about it" (Kuznets 1960,
p. 329). Machlup suggests that every new invention furnishes a
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new idea for potential combination with vast numbers of existing
ideas \: : : [and] the number of possible combinations increases geo-
metrically with the number of elements at hand" (Machlup 1960,
p. 156). It is this latter idea of an increasing number of possible
permutations of the available elements of technology as the stock
increases, when combined with the idea of a reduced likelihood
of duplicate discoveries as the number of possibilities increases
faster than the number of potential technology producers, that
seems most compelling to me.
(37) The implication is that the number (or amounts) of resources also can
increase geometrically in parallel with the inventions. (It is important to bear
in mind that Simon’s complete theory is fairly elaborate and I can only hint at
its full structure here.) Simon’s theory does actually explain the price trends
of (non-monopolistic) mineral resources. However, it must be granted that
the form of the explanation is schematic, for it cannot predict or explain price
data precisely (say, the price of gold 2 months from now) by deducing them
from the model plus initial conditions, but it is, nevertheless, a valuable and
testable alternative theory. Indeed, this is typical of economic theories and
constitutes no demerit. It shares its schematic character with its rival, the
hypothesis of nite resources. However, unlike its rival, the elaborate theory
in to which the assumption of innite resources is placed has a high level of
testability. (To be completely fair, some resource-nitist models have made
denite predictions, but often it is not clear how the prediction is logically
derived from the theory, assumed initial conditions and other background
knowledge. Indeed, it is not even clear what the background knowledge is.
Cf. Meadows et al. 1974)
(38) Let us return to the more general question. A sceptic might ask why he
should accept the idea that the number of possible combinations of inventions
grows geometrically with the number of elements. He might suggest that a
geometric combinatorial increase might still be nite. Inventions, he could
say, are like melodies: one can easily get the impression that the class of
possible melodies is innite, but though large it is far from innite in size.9
I believe that the best way of answering him is to explore the theoretical
content of inventions, that is, their World 3 aspect. This will show how it is
possible for an invention to be applied in a literally innite number of dierent
ways in production, not only with other inventions but alone. It will become
apparent that it is misleading to say that the number of possible combinations
of inventions increases geometrically with increases in the number of elements
9I am talking about melodies that can be appreciated by humans. Thus I am talking
about discernible note lengths and pitches, which will obviously be nite in number, and
melodies of nite length.
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at hand. Even keeping the number of basic inventions constant, the number of
ways in which inventions might be combined is innite. This fact is obscured
by looking at inventions as simply physical objects that one adds together
in dierent groups or permutations of order. This sees inventions as simply
World 1 objects. Popper’s notion of an autonomous and causally active world
of abstract entities, World 3, is, I think, the only way to understand how the
potential of our inventions and hence our resources is innite.
4 World 3 and the Unfathomable Content of
our Knowledge
(39) To recapitulate, World 3 is the realm of abstract, objective products
of the human mind: theories, logical relationships, numbers, symphonies.
Its content includes a diverse mixture from the humble Acheulian axe to the
magnicent constructions of modern mathematics such as Godel’s proof of the
incompleteness of arithmetic. The point I wish to stress here is that World 3
is a factor of economic production that cannot be reduced to Worlds 1 or 2,
and whose contribution is quite distinct.
(40) Suppose I make the following inference on paper: If it is cloudy, it will
rain; it is cloudy, therefore it will rain. On Popper’s model there are three
aspects to this inference. There are the marks on the paper, which constitute
the physical embodiment of the logical relationship between the premises and
the conclusion; there is the psychological process of inference that I make (or
go through) in grasping the logical relationship together with the ability to
make the inference again; and there is the actual logical relationship as such.
(41) It is important to stress that World 3 makes a dierence to our thought
and therefore economic production. For example, the existence of logical
standards makes a dierence to our thought. Even a fallibilist can allow that
we sometimes get things right, and not only that, but also that we get things
right because they are right. You believe that you are reading an article in
English (at least partly) because you are. Many people will accept the validity
of the above argument (at least partly) because it is valid; they will also reject
other arguments as invalid (at least partly) because they are invalid. You may
include training in logic etc. as other contributing factors in our discrimination
between valid and invalid inferences, but this does not make validity and
invalidity causally impotent, because validity cannot be dened in terms of
training or dispositions to discriminate.10 The logical contradiction between
10To deny the influence of logical relationships would be to imply something very strange
indeed: that the way things are never has the slightest influence on what we think or are
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say, Newton’s theory and Einstein’s theory of gravitation, made a dierence
to the way scientists think.
(42) World 3 has the following properties:
1. It is an abstract product of the human mind.
2. It is partially autonomous in four senses:
(a) it has a partly unfathomable content;
(b) it has an unintended and irrevocable structure and consequences;
(c) it has properties and relations that we discover but cannot alter;
(d) it is irreducible to psychological or physical states of aairs or laws.
3. It is causally active on World 1 via World 2.
(43) One of Popper’s arguments for the reality of World 3 is that our grasp of
a World 3 object (such as the natural numbers) can aect our interaction with
the physical world and that it is common sense that only real things can aect
a physical object. (However, it is wrong to see the aect on physical objects as
\constituting" the reality of World 3 objects.) An architect’s understanding
of mathematics makes a dierence to the buildings that he can construct or
would even consider constructing, but such an understanding would hardly
exist if the mathematics had not rst been invented. Hence World 3 makes
a dierence to economic production. But how much of a dierence can it
make? To answer this you need to look closely at its innite content.
(44) Part of the content of World 3 will always remain in principle un-
fathomable. World 3 has been likened to a library of human knowledge, but
although this is a good metaphor as far as it goes it is misleading. When a
theory is created it is written down in a book and some of its implications may
even be worked out and also written down. This is the part of the theory that
becomes represented in a physical form. Think of all the future worked-out
implications of the theory. This is still only a part of the theory’s content, the
rest is the part that never gets represented in physical form. There is always
a residual because the content is innite. There are two ways of bringing
prepared to maintain. Correctly identifying errors in reasoning is on this view a purely
accidental aair. But if the set of hypotheses we maintain in science is controlled even
slightly by the process of trial and error elimination, in which the false hypotheses are
cast from the body of science because they contradict true observation reports, then the
maintainance of some hypotheses after each period of elimination is partly explained by
their being true and the rejection of false ones is partly explained by the fact that they are
false.
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out the innite content of a theory: by talking of the information content
and the logical content. The logical content of a theory is the class of all the
(nontautological) consequences that can be logically derived from the theory
(it may be identied with Tarski’s \consequence class").
(45) The argument for the innite logical content of a theory t can be put
thus. Suppose an innite list of statements that are pair-wise contradictory
and which individually do not entail t: a; b; c : : : Then the statement \t or a or
both" follows from t. The same holds for each and every one of the statements
in the innite list. Since the statements in the list are pair-wise contradictory
one can infer that none of the statements \t or a or both", \t or b or both"
etc., is interderivable. Thus the logical content of t must be innite.
(46) This in itself is not so important, but when combined with the idea of
information content, the two notions produce some very interesting ramica-
tions. In the Logic of Scientic Discovery (Popper 1980), Popper put forward
the idea that a statement says more the more it forbids. Carnap, accepting
Popper’s suggestion, dened the assertive power of a sentence as the class
of possible cases it excludes (Carnap 1942, p. 151). Later Popper reformu-
lated the intuitive idea in terms of theories, of both high and low universality
(Popper 1974, see esp. note 15). The information content is the class of all
those statements that are logically incompatible with the given theory. Thus
since Einstein’s theory contradicts Newton’s theory, Einstein’ theory is part
of the information content of Newton’s theory. Newton could hardly have
known this, and so it could not have been part of his psychology.
(47) Most philosophers resist this analysis because of their adherence to
psychologism and conceptual analysis. But Popper’s analysis reveals that
much of interest is to be discovered in the analysis of theories as such, con-
sidered as objective entities, and their logical relationships with one another.
(48) As Popper shows, when we combine this result with the idea of logical
content we obtain a parallel result, for if E is part of the information content
of N then Non E is part of N ’s logical content. Thus both the logical and
information content of theories consist of an innite number of non-trivial
consequences. As Popper says, it follows that the task of understanding a
theory is innite. Furthermore, there are an innite number of unknown the-
ories that form part of the information content and logical content of Newton’s
theory, and indeed of any empirical theory. Since the concept of knowledge
is often quite restrictively dened, it might be better to speak in more gen-
eral terms of \representations", and say more generally that Newton’s mind
obviously did not have a representation of Einstein’s theory or its negation,
let alone most of the other theories that are part of its information or logical
content.
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(49) Of course, one can also mention the work of Go¨del in this connection
as pointing to the unfathomable content of our theories, and therefore of our
inventions and resources. It can be shown that the complete system of all
true propositions in the arithmetic of numbers is not axiomatizable and is
undecidable. This means that there will always be an innite number of
unsolved problems in arithmetic. I wanted to focus on the ideas of logical
and information content because these are rarely discussed or applied to new
interesting areas. The exception has been the late Professor Bartley, who has
applied these ideas in a fascinating way to art criticism and the Marxian idea
of alienation (Bartley III 1990).
5 The Special Economic Status of Objective
Knowledge: Resources and Inventions as
World 3 Objects
(50) The above has some interesting implications for an economic analysis
of resources and the issue of long-run diminishing returns.
(51) Just as a resource needs to be interpreted, so an invention cannot be
reduced to its chemical and physical properties and relations, but must be
placed in a means-end relationship. All inventions are means/ends relation-
ships; they are invented and adopted for a purpose. This shows their World 2
aspect. But a means/end relationship is partly constituted by its theoretical
interpretation, and thus all inventions are theory impregnated. Inventions,
therefore, have a world 3 aspect also.
(52) I must make clear at this point that I do not subscribe to the popular
view that every technological decision and action (including inventions) is
prescribed by one or more scientic theories; in fact none are. This would
overlook the fact that scientic laws are universal and therefore can only pro-
scribe; alone, they can tell us only what cannot happen, not what will happen,
and therefore alone cannot tell us what we should do to achieve a given end.
Building a bridge, car, space-ship and tube of toothpaste is a matter of en-
gineers discovering sets of constructible initial conditions that typically lead
eciently to the desired result. This is a conjecture and refutation aair.
Universal theories of science help the engineer insofar as they can be used to
eliminate some of the hopeful candidates of ecient sets of initial conditions,
namely the ones whose description contradicts the accepted scientic theories.
(53) In talking of the theories that help to constitute and identify a given
invention or resource, I include these low level theories. But I also want to
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make it clear that even these theories plus our psychological dispositions to-
ward the invention or resource do not exhaust the useful possibilities inherent
in a type or particular invention or type or particular portion of a resource.
It is sucient for my argument that at least part of the range of its useful
possibilities is encompassed by these low level theories.
(54) Now theories as World 3 objects have three relevant properties:
1. They are universal, applying to all space and time.
2. They have innitely varied logical/information content.
3. They are innitely copyable.
(55) Now, on the basis of these facts it becomes clear how it is possible
for a) an invention to be applied in a literally innite number of signic-
antly dierent possible ways and b) combined in a literally innite number
of signicantly dierent possible ways with other inventions. But an exactly
analogous argument applies to resources, for resources are also interpreted
as a means/end relationship.
(56) Any particular wheel or lever or computer will wear out, but due to
the universality of the theory that helps to constitute the invention, the in-
vention type may be applied a potentially innite number of times without
diminished eect. Due to the innitely varied logical/information content
of the invention-theory, the invention may be applied in an innite number
of signicantly varied ways. No one person, therefore, can work out all the
useful content of a theory of a resource. If one employs more and more people
on a given piece of land, one will get diminishing returns; after all, there is
only so much room on a piece of land. But one may not get this when em-
ploying more and more people on a given theory, say the theory of levers or
the quantum computer. Due to its innite content, it has an innitely varied
terrain to work on, as it where. This is most clearly the case with something
like the theory of arithmetic, where in the light of the work of Go¨del and
Tarski, there will always be an innite number of problems to work on. Un-
like a piece of land, an indenite number of copies can be made of a theory.
At any time, any number of people can be working out useful ramications
and implications of the theory and applying them.
(57) Let us return to Machlup’s suggestion that the number of possible com-
binations of inventions increases geometrically with the number of elements
at hand. From our analysis it is clear that any two inventions will each have
a cluster of theories that explains, partly constitutes and identies it. It is the
logical and information content of these theories that allows us to combine
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them to make further inventions. But because of the innite content of the
theories they can be combined in a potentially innite number of ways. To
explain the emergence of any given combination one will look to see what
the inventor’s problem situation was, how the inventor searched through dif-
ferent combinations of dierent portions of logical and information content,
and nally, how the two or more invention-theories were combined. On this
analysis, it becomes clearer that a \fusion of two inventions" may consist of
the following possible combinations:
(a) Proper subsets of the theoretical contents of the two inventions.
(b) A proper subset of one with the whole of the other.
(c) A newly discovered subset of the content of one with a familiar subset
of another.
(d) Whole or part contents brought together via a bonding theory.
(58) In fact, since the aim of the fusion of two inventions is a new inven-
tion, the two invention-theories will form part of a larger action schema, and
so it will always be through some third theory that the two inventions are
combined.
(59) I suggest that this logical analysis is a more subtle and powerful way
of revealing the way in which the number of possible combinations of in-
ventions increases much more rapidly with the number of elements at hand,
than saying with Machlup that they increase \geometrically". This is re-
inforced when one considers that in combining two theories one sometimes
obtains interesting implications and ramications not contained in the con-
tent of either theory considered alone. Watkins has fruitfully explored this
possibility in his book Science and Scepticism (Watkins 1984). It is often
said that an invention that simply combines previous inventions is not really
a new invention, but a logical analysis of inventions in terms of content al-
lows us to see that such invention-combinations can bring radically new useful
consequences, emergent properties, into existence.
6 The Possibility of Innitely New Information
Processing: Why Tipler Needs World 3
(60) Before I conclude this paper, I must discuss the relevance of Frank
Tipler’s fascinating argument for indenite economic growth to my own ar-
gument.
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(61) Tipler argues that life and hence economic growth can continue forever
(Tipler & Barrow 1986, Tipler 1994). Carbon based life-forms like ourselves
are doomed eventually in the extremely high temperatures to be encountered
at the approach to the nal singularity in a closed universe. However, our
successors|highly sophisticated, self-reproducing computers|will colonize
the whole of space and will eectively undergo an innite amount of economic
growth and experience before the singularity.
(62) Tipler accepts that growth rates within the present epoch are limited
by physics, but thinks that most predictions of physical limits have ignored
economics and thus grossly underestimated the potential for economic growth.
Following Simon, Tipler assumes that economic production is equivalent to
the production of services, but Tipler adds that each of these units of service
are in turn equivalent to the production and transfer of amounts of inform-
ation. Thus the limits of economic growth are the limits of the growth of
knowledge: the amount of information that can be read, stored and pro-
cessed.
(63) Tipler says: \Information processing is constrained by the rst and
second laws of thermodynamics. These laws imply that the amount of in-
formation that can be processed at a given temperature T is I = E=(kT ln 2)
where E is the energy available for processing, (ln 2) is the natural logarithm
of 2, and k is Boltzmann’s constant. Now any temperature T that we can use
is greater than the background radiation, which is 3 degrees on the Kelvin
scale, and if we limit ourselves to operations on the Earth, the greatest avail-
able energy is E = Mc2 , where M is the mass of the Earth." (Tipler 1988,
pp. 4{5) Thus even life based on steady state economies is doomed, if it
remains conned to the Earth. But life need not be conned to the Earth,
since there is the possibility of expanding into and beyond the solar system
using von Neumann probes. In any case, Tipler points out, this relationship
between energy and information processing allows for a one hundred-billion-
fold increase in economic wealth before we reach the physical limits of the
Earth. This estimate is based on the assumption that we can increase eco-
nomic wealth at the same rate as we increase the speed of our computers.
(64) Tipler argues that what is important to future self-conscious intelli-
gent life will be subjective time, measured in terms of the number of thoughts
experienced, not what physicists call proper time, that measured by atomic
clocks. Tipler identies thought with information processing of high speed
computers. Tipler argues that indenite economic growth is possible in a
closed universe only if an innite amount of information can be processed
before the end of time. This is possible if the rate of information processing
increases to innity before the big crunch. This, Tipler argues, is possible.
The required energy for the information processing is obtained from the dif-
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ferential speeds at which dierent regions of the universe will collapse, a
phenomenon known as sheer.
(65) However, there is an important qualication. If this information pro-
cessing is done on a nite state machine, then eventually it will start to repeat
itself: no new thought would be possible. This information processing must
be conducted on an innite state machine. To supply this machine, Tipler
conjectures that life, taken as a whole, can be regarded as an innite state ma-
chine; but Tipler fails to explain how. I conjecture that the body of scientic
knowledge provides the basis for an innite state machine. The unfathomable
information content of theories provides the \innite tape" for the Turing ma-
chine. Stated more generally, the possibility of thinking an innite number of
new thoughts is made possible by World 3. It must be born in mind that there
are two senses of \information" here. Tipler’s \information" is the engineer’s
conception of actually encoded information (Shannon and Weaver), existing
as realized distinct states of matter/energy, such as on-o electrical states in a
computer. The \Logical content" and \information content" of say, scientic
theories, are mostly unencoded, existing as only potential information in the
engineer’s sense. In some places Tipler explicitly identies knowledge and
information. But the above analysis of the unfathomable content of scientic
theories makes it important to distinguish between knowledge and informa-
tion. Tipler’s bold and fascinating argument is thereby reinforced.
7 Conclusion
(66) One might think that there is a lacuna in my argument. The fact that
an invention can be applied in an innite number of signicantly dierent
ways does not show that those ways are all economic or even useful. But
this misunderstands my case. I am not expounding an a priori argument that
concludes that resources are necessarily innite. I am making a conjecture
that resources are innite in the long-term and the trying to explain how this
is possible by looking at the interaction of Worlds 1, 2 and 3.
(67) I think that my argument points to the World 3 abstract structure
of our resources and inventions that acts as both a \scaolding of thought"
for the inventor and as a means whereby the human mind can endlessly ex-
pand the usefulness of the world. Whether this be for good or ill, is another
question.
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